9It is indisputable that the loss of life attributed to the sinking of Indianapolis could have been mitigated had the proper individuals in the Navy realized sooner that the ship was overdue. Unfortunately, this was not the case. The United States Navy did, however, learn from this disaster and took immediate steps to ensure that no Sailor or Marine would again face a similar situation. Escort requirements were stiffened, lifesaving equipment improved, and more rigid movement reporting procedures put in place. The story of Indianapolis continues to serve as a point of departure for learning, as evidenced by this volume. Actions of captain and crew of Indianapolis throughout their ordeal, and in the aftermath, stand as exemplars of the highest traditions and honor of the United States Navy.Indianapolis (CA-35) was a decorated World War II warship that is primarily remembered for her worst 15 minutes. The Portland class cruiser was commissioned on 15 November 1932 and became Flagship, Scouting Force, U.S. Fleet in 1933. She also served as President Franklin Roosevelt's ship of state, carrying him to the review of the U.S. Fleet on the Hudson River on 31 May 1934 (see Figure FM-2) and on a Good Neighbor cruise to South America in 1936. She served with distinction from the attack on Pearl Harbor through the delivery of components for the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, much of it as Admiral Spruance's flagship for the Fifth Fleet. Indianapolis earned ten battle stars for her service in World War II and was credited with shooting down nine enemy planes. This decorated record of service is, unfortunately, overshadowed by the first 15 minutes of 30 July 1945 when she was struck by two torpedoes from Japanese submarine I-58 and sent to the bottom of the Philippine Sea.The sinking of Indianapolis and the loss of 880 crew out of 1,196- most deaths occurring in the 4-5 day wait for a rescue delayed because of an unreported non-arrival-is a tragedy in U.S. naval history. The court-martial of the ship's captain, Charles Butler McVay III, for endangering his ship through negligence by failing to zigzag when U.S. Navy tactical doctrine deemed it prudent, despite Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Chester Nimitz's recommendation against, further mires the story in controversy. Embracing the lessons of Indianapolis's final voyage, the failed operational protocol in the aftermath, and the treatment of Captain McVay can teach the current Navy lessons in the responsibility of command, the need for clear operational procedures, the need for vigilance at all times, and the importance of proactively conveying honored Navy command traditions as a means of putting controversial leadership decisions in context. Emphasis on the lessons learned from Indianapolis will not only honor her final crew, but allow for a refocus on her commendable service.